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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING CONTRACTS FROM A SOCIOECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE

JEFFREY L. HARRISON*
This invitation to participate in a symposium issue devoted to teaching
contracts law has forced me to consider more specifically than before how my
interest in socioeconomics specifically influences my teaching. Having only
seen one other contracts teacher at work, I am in no position to offer a
comparison with other teachers. Nevertheless, it seems almost certain that
teaching economics for eight years and developing a strong sense that
conventional economics offers a limited perspective have had a measurable
impact on my approach to contracts.1
This essay begins with a brief discussion of what socioeconomics is.2 In
this section I also address whether one must be well versed in conventional
economics in order to apply a socioeconomic perspective. I then discuss the
basic themes that are present throughout my contracts class that stem from my
interest in socioeconomics. Underlying these themes is the more fundamental
goal of devising methodologies for assessing the quality of contracts. By
quality, I mean something more and perhaps more subtle than whether the
parties have conformed to all the formal requirements. Instead, I encourage
students to examine whether all of the many factors leading to the formation of
a contract are ones to be supported. Finally, I identify some specific materials
that lend themselves to a socioeconomic perspective that are not always
included in the casebook.3
Before beginning, one caveat is in order. Like most contracts teachers, I
plow my way through most if not all of the contracts topics from offer and
* Stephen O’Connell Professor of Law, College of Law, The University of Florida.
1. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Law and Socioeconomics, J. LEG. EDUC. 224 (1999);
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People and the Obligations of Legal
Theory, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1997); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and
Unconscionability, 35 W. & MARY L. REV. 445 (1994) [hereinafter Harrison, Class, Personality].
2. Those wishing to follow-up may want to read Harrison, Law and Socioeconomics, supra
note 1 and Robert Ashford, Socioeconomics: What is its Place in Law Practice?, 1997 WISC. L.
REV. 611. See also the Law and Socioeconomics Section of the AALS sponsors meeting at the
annual AALS conventions.
3. In my experience of switching contracts casebooks every three or four years, I have not
found one that was superior to the rest in terms of permitting me to apply a socioeconomic
perspective.
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acceptance and remedies to consideration, promissory estoppel, and excuse. I
also include fairly extensive coverage of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. I sincerely doubt that some unlucky visitor assigned to sit in on my
class for a semester would note a huge difference between my course and that
offered by another contracts teacher. The impact of a socioeconomic approach
is manifested, I think, by differing degrees of emphases on different topics, the
introduction of some unconventional topics and a running dialogue that
involves both teaching contract law and maintaining a critical perspective. In
terms of actual class time, my sense is that this perspective directly affects my
class about 20% of the time.
A.

What is Socioeconomics?

Robert Ashford, the leading and most energetic proponent of combining
law and socioeconomics, offers this general description of socioeconomics:
“[s]ocioeconomics begins with the assumption that an adequate understanding
of economic behavior cannot be achieved by the assumptions of autonomy,
rationality, and efficiency that stand at the epistemological foundations of
neoclassical economics . . . .”4 In short, socioeconomics relies on any
discipline—economics, sociology, psychology, biology—that may be useful in
order to achieve a less sterile and fuller understanding of what motivates
people when they transact. One way to grasp with more specificity the
distinction between the socioeconomic approach and the economic approach is
to examine three of the more important differences.
1.

The Importance of Psychic Income

Psychic income is used by conventional economics to “explain” what
might otherwise seem irrational. Thus, if a person does something that appears
to be, for example, inconsistent with his or her self-interest, it is explained by
psychic income. Thus, leaving a tip for a server in a restaurant to which one is
almost sure never to return is explained by psychic income. Most gifts given
without an expectation of a return gift would also have to be explained by
psychic income. Amartya Sen puts it this way: “no matter whether you are a
single-minded egoist or a raving altruist or a class conscious militant, you will
appear to be maximizing your own utility in this enchanted world . . . .”5 To
the socioeconomist, however, “psychic income” registers more as “I don’t
know” than an explanation and identifies areas in which research is warranted.

4. Ashford, supra note 2, at 612.
5. Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic
Theory, 6 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 317, 323 (1977).
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What is “Better Off?”

The notion of being “better off” seeps into law and economics when one
begins to analyze what it means for an outcome to be efficient. For example, a
change in the allocation of a resource is said to be Pareto Superior if at least
one person is better off and no one is made worse off. As a normative matter,
how could anyone oppose on moral grounds a change that seems to increase
the welfare of some while not decreasing the welfare of any others? This
obviously fits nicely with contract formation because one could argue that, on
its face, every voluntarily formed contract is a movement to a Pareto Superior,
and therefore morally superior, position.6 The problem for the socioeconomist
is just how much one should infer from outward signals that one is better off.
For example, if a person buys a pack of cigarettes, are they “better off” in any
meaningful sense? Moreover, suppose the cigarette purchase is the result of a
nicotine addiction and that the buyer only tried smoking in the first place
because hundreds of commercials for cigarettes suggested that smoking makes
one look “cooler” or more likely to have a good time. There are a variety of
ways in which the concept of “better off” can be unraveled, but in all these
instances the socioeconomist is willing to look at the underlying bases for
preference formation and question whether all these bases should be afforded
the same level of respect by the law.
3.

The Influence of Law

The third fundamental difference between conventional law and economics
and law and socioeconomics is the view taken of law itself. Under the
conventional view, “tastes and preferences” are a given. That means they are
assumed to be constant and not altered by the law. This is not to say that law
does not affect the way in which these preferences are manifested. This is an
important distinction. Suppose someone experiences a certain level of utility
from hot fudge sundaes. As the price goes up, he or she will buy fewer but the
generalized preference for hot fudge sundaes will not change. Similarly, if a
law is passed imposing a $1.00 fine for each hot fudge sundae consumed,
people will buy fewer, but again the basic desire for sundaes will be the same.
On the other hand, suppose law has the capacity to actually change
preferences. For example, if there is a law “against” something, the baseline
desire for that item may change. Hot fudge sundaes could suddenly taste
worse to the moralist because it is “against the law” to eat them. Or, they

6. An allocation is Pareto Optimal when there are no reallocations that would not leave at
least one person worse off.
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could seem to taste better because they are “forbidden.” In either instance, law
can change tastes and preferences.7
Does this description of socioeconomics as a counterpoint or reaction to
conventional economics mean that one can only “come” to teaching from a
socioeconomic perspective by being well-versed in conventional economics
and its limitations? This is a hard question for a person whose background
entails a relatively sophisticated intuitive skepticism about conventional
economics, but my inclination is to say no. My sense is that the three basic
distinctions discussed here all play off of or arise from assumptions the
conventional analysis asks one to make in the first place. As a matter of
common sense, most teachers are not likely to get into matters of psychic
income, the contingent nature of being better off, or whether law affects tastes
and preferences. In other words, one can teach from a socioeconomic
perspective without addressing what seems to be an artificial starting point.
On the other hand, if one wants to introduce law and economics by, for
example, assigning opinions by Judge Posner, then understanding conventional
economics in order to point out its weaknesses seems required. Of course the
introduction of economic analysis is not always voluntary. Oft times a student
who has had law and economics before coming to law school will raise the
matter directly or indirectly by answers to hypotheticals that introduce—in the
context of policy discussions—matters of efficiency.8 In these instances, it
probably makes for a fuller discussion if the teacher has more than just an
intuitive skepticism.
B.

Basic Themes

There a number of ideas or themes that appear when I teach Contracts that
reflect a socioeconomic orientation.9 First is the distinction between the
subjective and the objective or what I refer to as the “everyone is average”
assumption. The second theme relates to one’s sense of justice and sense of
entitlement and how they are developed. In this context, there is a fair amount
7. The more technical description of this is that conventional economics assumes that tastes
and preferences are exogenously determined. They are determined by factors that are outside the
analysis. If law has an impact on tastes and preferences, it is an endogenous variable.
8. Some semesters I make a point not to mention law and economics at all to my first-year
students but by the end of the course it has been discussed. Typically what happens is that a
student either reads something I have written or has discovered that I have a Ph.D. in economics
and the student decides that economics-based answers are what I am really after. Other times,
they have heard of the Coase Theorem from their property or torts teachers and attempt to apply it
in my class. Finally, there are instances in which they more or less think their way into an
analysis that involves an economic logic and I facilitate the discussion by introducing them to the
vocabulary.
9. I do not want to suggest that these themes were well thought out in advance. As I noted
at the outset of this essay, I am more in the mode of reflecting on what I have done that stems
from a socioeconomic slant on things.
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of discussion of the allocative verses the distributive goals of contract law.
The third theme involves the process of examining opinions as pieces of
advocacy. This involves looking closely at the wording of opinions, but it also
requires the students to become conscious of their own information filtering
processes.
1.

The Objective and Subjective

The difference between what may generally be regarded as observed or
objective reality and actual reality comes up in contracts at a number of places.
Primarily, I emphasize the distinction when discussing remedies and assent. In
the area of remedies, the importance of this is obvious. In the typical contracts
case, damages in the amount of the market value of expectancy are awarded.
In effect, the rights one has under a contract are protected by what Calabresi
and Melamed label a liability rule.10
The usual hypothetical is one in which a buyer has agreed to pay $150,
let’s say, for an item that he or she values at considerably more and which has
a market value of $200 or less. The seller then breaches and sells the item to a
third party for $300. The damages are $50—the buyer’s objective expectancy.
Under the notion of the “efficient breach,” no one is worse off, the seller and
the new buyer are better off and it appears that the law has worked to an
outcome that is fair to all parties.11 Obviously, this is not so fair to the original
buyer who is worse off. The problem is that objective values are not the same
as subjective ones, and the law, rather than wading into the difficulties of
responding to individuals, treats all people as “averages.”
The averaging perspective also finds its way into virtually every nook and
cranny of contract law. “Offer and acceptance” is centered around what
appears to be happening and not what happened. If people seem to have
agreed, then they have. Concepts of duress and undue influence appear to
soften the averaging affect. Thus, a person who appears to consent but is
under duress has not consented. But even these off-setting doctrines are
centered around what the “average” person would find coercive.
The purpose of alerting the students to the averaging perspective of
contract law is three fold. First, it illustrates the narrow behavioral
assumptions of contract law. The foremost of these, as I discuss below,12 is
that people are basically self-interested in the narrowest sense of the term.
Second, it leads to the issue of what institutions and behaviors are implicitly
legitimized by law when it adopts the “averaging” perspective. For example,

10. See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
11. This leaves aside the possibility that there is an independent value associated with
requiring people to keep their promises.
12. See infra text and accompanying notes 32-33.
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suppose we call duress an influence that prevents a party from acting in a
manner that is consistent with his or her true preferences. Let’s further assume
that there are groups or classes of people that are especially susceptible to
being “pulled off” of their true preferences. Under the “averaging” view, these
people may not be afforded the benefit of the usual contract policing
mechanisms. In these instances, the “averaging” approach has the effect of
supporting the continued possible exploitation of identifiable segments of
society.13
This is not to say there are not exceptions to “averaging.” Thus, the third
reason I like to get the averaging issue before the students is to permit them to
consider the explanation for patterns of exceptions to the “averaging” rule. In
remedies, the use of specific performance can overcome the “averaging”
problem. In the area of contract formation, the treatment of minors is the
principle example. There are, however, other possibilities. For example, it is
possible that informal exceptions are made for elderly women. To some extent
these exceptions are a function of stereotypes that the complaining party may
decide to use to his or her advantage but whose successful use may perpetuate
less beneficial outcomes. On the other hand, the law seems to have few
exceptions for those who, because of class differences or a history of
discrimination or other cultural factors, tend to behave in different from
“average” ways when negotiating. In short, by noting the difference between
actual reality and objective “reality” for the purposes of the law, one can begin
to probe when and why law allows for social and behavioral differences.
2.

Fairness and a Sense of Entitlement

Closely related to “averaging” is the issue of whether contract law can and
should respond to differences with respect to one’s sense of fairness. Here I
typically tell two true stories. Both involve actual events at my law school.
The first deals with two entry-level professors who were hired several years
ago. Neither had the foresight to negotiate a moving expense allowance and,
thus, after their appointment, asked the dean what the law school would pay in
the way of assistance. Both were told a fixed amount which I have now
forgotten, but let’s say $3,000. One of the new appointees simply said
“thanks.” The other became quite exorcised, arguing that the amount was too
low and that it was “unacceptable.” The dean relented and increased the
allowance.
When I was told the story, I began to wonder about the different reactions.
The satisfied faculty member had attended a mid-level state law school, had
practiced law for a mid-sized firm and came from a lower middle class family
in which the father was largely absent. The unhappy faculty member attended
high-ranking schools, served in a federal clerkship, and came from a family in
13. See Harrison, Class, Personality, supra note 1.
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which both parents were professionals. As one might expect, they were quite
different personality-wise. The first new professor was obviously happy to
have the job and immediately set about to participate in the full range of law
school activities. The second seemed to always find something wrong with the
classrooms, the salary, the curriculum, etc. But mainly he was absent from
anything that was institutionally oriented, preferring to devote his efforts to
projects that would lead to advancement in the profession.
The second story involves a faculty member who each year, like everyone
else, received a letter indicating what his salary would be for next year,
including whatever raise the dean had granted. For several years, he knew
only his own raise, and he typically acknowledged getting the letter by writing
a note to the dean thanking him for the recognition. One year, through a fluke,
he discovered that his raise was below that of many of his colleagues. This
concerned him enough that he asked the dean why his raise was lower. The
response from the dean was that his was lower because “you have always been
happy with your raises.”
In both cases, a personal sense of what is fair comes into play. In the first
instance, it was affected by a life-long process of socialization. In the second,
a simple lack of information affected the faculty member’s sense of fairness.
This sense of fairness leads to different distributive outcomes. In both
examples, the person with the relatively less developed sense of entitlement
received a smaller portion of the gain from making the contract than others did.
And, by virtue of that, all other things remaining equal, the material outcomes
are different. Mainly, I want the students to examine the quality of contracts
that have different distributive outcomes. In particular, I want them to
understand that contract law and how it is applied has an impact on the
material well-being of people and that it may perpetuate the superior wellbeing of those who simply feel they deserve more even though the sense of
dessert may be based on something that is irrelevant to any morally based
notion of dessert.
3.

Law as advocacy

The third theme I include throughout the course is the recognition of
judges as people—typically establishment types—who write opinions that are
subtly and notsosubtly designed to convince the reader that the outcome is fair
or reasonable, if not preordained. I am speaking not so much about the
reasoning of the judge, but about the descriptive language. To put it in terms
we are all familiar with, judges write opinions that attempt to push our
sympathetic buttons. The way this emphasis manifests itself in class is that
about every other day I ask, “At what point in the opinion did you first sense
the outcome was going for the plaintiff (or defendant)?”
This or something like it is a much used device among law professors and
the answers are predictable after one teaches the course for a few years. The
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examples are fairly well-known. In Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,14 when
Judge Cardozo, in his first paragraph, refers to the defendant as someone who
“styles herself a ‘creator of fashion’”15 and then describes her effort as one
designed “to turn this vogue into money,” it is hard to imagine that she will
prevail in the action. The key is that the language suggests she is not
necessarily someone who is a “creator of fashion.” No, instead that is only
what she claims to be. Similarly, any effort to turn a vogue into money does
not sound serious; it seems like an effort to make money on the vanity of
others. Judge Cardozo pushes the buttons of that era by emphasizing the greed
and frivolity of Duff-Gordon.
On the opposite end of the spectrum is Emma Fienberg, the well-known (to
virtually every law student) loyal employee of the S. Pfeiffer Manufacturing
Co.16 Here, after a paragraph describing the procedural history of the case,
Commissioner Doerner lets the reader know that the plaintiff has worked for
over forty years for the defendant and was “but 17 years of age” when she
started.17 It would be enough for the reader to know that Feinberg had worked
for the defendant for a number of years or even that she has worked for forty
years. The age when she started seems irrelevant to the legal analysis and the
“but” is clearly uncalled for except as a device to raise in us a sense of injustice
as far as her treatment by the defendant.
One of the more interesting instances of button-pushing occurs in Vokes v.
Arthur Murry Inc.,18 one of the “dance lesson” cases. Vokes essentially buys
far more dance lessons than she can possibly use from some smooth operators
who assured her in a variety of ways that she could become a great dancer.
Vokes, as the court points out in the first sentence after describing the
procedural niceties, is “a widow of 51 and without family.”19 In addition, we
find out that upon visiting Davenport’s School of Dance she “whiled away the
pleasant hours, sometimes in a private room, absorbing his accomplished sales
technique . . . .”20 Vokes is fascinating on two levels. First, and relating to the
ideas of averaging and a sense of justice, the court clearly regards Vokes’
“reality” as one that the courts should not legitimize. Second, the case
illustrates how the view of law with respect to “protected” groups can change.
The “helpless widow” image button the court pushes in the case is scoffed at
by many of today’s students. In class, I try to get them to think about the
change and what now might be viewed as appealing to our collective sense of
fairness.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
Id. at 214.
Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
Id. at 164.
212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
Id. at 907.
Id.
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One more case that illustrates the use of language, changing norms, and
social values is Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.21 This 1974 case is an important
one in tracing the erosion of the terminable-at-will rule as it applies to
employment contracts.22 Monge, an employee of Beebe Rubber, was
terminated after she refused the social advances of a supervisor. The court
ruled that a “bad faith” termination could give rise to damages.23 Looking at
the case now, those facts would seem to be sufficiently compelling. In 1974,
however, the judge evidently felt the outcome required additional facts to make
it more acceptable. Thus, we find that the plaintiff had been “a school teacher
in Costa Rica,” was attending college at night, paid for college with the money
she earned from the defendant and was married with three children.24
Monge contains enough fodder for discussion to fill a week. Today it is
easy to say that it is bad faith, at least, to fire someone who refuses a
supervisor’s sexual advances. On the other hand, suppose in 1974 Monge had
not been a former schoolteacher, was single, a college dropout and had served
time for a felony. It is not unreasonable to believe the case would have gone
against her. In a sense, Monge, as she actually was in 1974, was the sort of
person the court decided to protect. Put differently, what happened to her was
unfair; she deserved better than she got from the contract. The “other” Monge
might not have been viewed as deserving of better. If this different treatment
is true, it could simply be that the real Monge was more credible than the excon Monge. On the other hand, it may mean that “no” from a former school
teacher and mother meant “no” in 1974 and “no” from a high school drop out
meant “maybe” and the court would have been willing to entertain that the
firing was the result of a misunderstanding but not bad faith. The point is that
the case tells us what information the court felt it needed to include in order to
create an appearance of fairness. And, if the factual details would not be
necessary today, it tells us about how the view of how people deserve to be
treated, in contracts and in life, have changed.
C. Materials That I Use That May Differ from the Norm
I am sure that every contracts teacher has materials that he or she exposes
the students to that are not necessarily in the casebook. These materials reveal,
far more than casebook selection, the teacher’s approach to the course. The
following examples reflect my socioeconomic approach.

21. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
22. See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, The “New” Terminable-at-Will Employment
Contract: An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REV. 327 (1984).
23. Monge, 316 A.2d at 549.
24. Id. at 550.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1242

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

1.

[Vol. 44:1233

Results of Experiments Dealing with Fairness and Entitlement

Over the years I have introduced the students to a number of experiments
that focus on fairness in exchanges.25 Two that I am particularly fond of right
now are found in the work of Richard Thaler. The first one involves the
following question:
You are lying on a beach on a hot day . . . . For the last hour you have been
thinking about how much you would like a cold bottle of your favorite brand
of beer. A companion . . . offers to bring back a beer from the only nearby
place where beer is sold (a fancy resort hotel) (a small run-down grocery
store). He says that the beer might be expensive and so asks how much you
are willing to pay for the beer. He says that he will buy the beer if it costs as
much or less than the price you state. But if it costs more than the price you
state he will not buy it . . . . What price do you tell him?26

The question is asked in its “fancy resort” form to some subjects and the
“run-down grocery store” form to others. What Thaler discovered is that
willingness to pay varied not with the beer itself and its thirst quenching
capacity but with the type of vendor. People were willing to pay more for the
resort beer than for the run-down grocery store beer.27 Put differently, a price
that was deemed as “unfair” at the run-down grocery store was not seen as
“unfair” when charged by the resort. The sense of unfairness was so strong
that the subjects were willing to forego the beer rather than pay a price that was
too high for that particular vendor.28
The second experiment involves two “players” who are presented with an
opportunity to keep a certain sum of money. One player is the allocator. In a
one-try situation, he or she can offer a certain portion of the sum to the other
player. If that player accepts, he gets the sum offered and the allocator keeps
what is left. If the other party declines, neither party keeps any portion of the
initial sum put into play. In these experiments, even a one-penny offer by the
allocator would leave both parties better off. In the actual trials, the allocators
rarely offered very low amounts and, when they did, they were typically

25. Examples other than the ones discussed here can be found in Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1309 (1986). A good survey is Donald L. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998).
26. RICHARD THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC
LIFE 31 (1992).
27. Id. at 32.
28. I have asked others what they think the result of this experiment means. Most agree that
the “rational” thing is to offer one price for the beer where ever it is to be purchased. The
deviation for this strategy, they say, is probably just explained by efforts by the subjects to
estimate what a beer is likely to cost and not by a sense of fairness.
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rejected even though the rejection meant that neither party benefited in a
traditional sense.29
Both of these experiments test the conventional ideas of self-interest and
rationality. If the beer is the same, why is it not worth the same? Why would a
person turn down a “gift” with the result being that he or she is worse off in a
material sense than he or she would otherwise have been? In both instances,
there seems to be an interpersonal sense of justice that comes into play. This
possibility helps explain why liability rules may not address all the losses
associated with a breach.30 In addition, the example leads one to discuss
problems associated with the settlement of contract claims as well as a number
of other issues.
2.

Moral Development

Nearly every semester I introduce my class to Lawrence Kohlberg’s stages
of moral development.31 As most readers know, Kohlberg suggests that people
go through stages of moral development ranging from what we regard as
narrowly self-interested or selfish to taking into consideration the welfare of
others to acting on the basis of principles about right and wrong.
In conjunction with this, I usually ask them to read a rather ordinary case,
Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Bratton.32 Bratton, a woman, contracted to have her
possessions moved by Allied Van Lines. When the moving truck was packed
at the end of the day, she was asked to sign a bill of lading limiting the liability
of Allied to $1.25 per pound. Her possessions were lost and she sought to
recover on the bases of “mistake” and “lack of assent.” She lost the case. The
appellate opinion contains a short but interesting excerpt of trial testimony:
Q: Did anyone prevent you or stop you from reading the bill of lading?
A: No.
Q: Did anyone say anything to you that you took to be an inducement not
to read it?
A: No. Like I said before, the house was really cold, and the men were
tired. They were in a hurry to get out.33
It seems clear that Bratton’s assent was not motivated by selfishness in the
narrow sense. From her comment, she felt either direct pressure not to tie the
tired men up any longer or a subtle indirect pressure from having a viewpoint
that required her to consider what others wanted. One possibility, in
Kohlbergian terms, is that she is an ordinary person with some sense of
29. THALER, supra note 26, at 32.
30. Liability rules allow the breaching party to pay the non-breaching party its costs and to
keep all the gains associated with the breach.
31. Lawrence Kohlberg, Moral States and Moralization, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND
BEHAVIOR 31 (Thomas Lickona ed., 1976).
32. 351 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1977).
33. Id. at 346 n.2.
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responsibility to others who was caught dealing with a corporation’s form that
is drafted to reflect the firm’s narrow self-interest. Another is that there is a
gender difference that accounts for a need to find an agreeable way to end her
interaction with the tired men.
I pose the question to the class of whether the outcome of the case is the
right one given that the parties seem to be working from very different places
in terms of what is acceptable in the treatment of others. There is, obviously,
no good answer for this, but the exercise typically results in a spirited
discussion about the capacity of contract law to allow for differences between
and among people. Sometimes the discussion goes into possible gender-based
differences in negotiation strategies. I tend to remind the students that say it is
impossible for contracts law to allow for these differences that cases—like
Monge and Vokes—in fact may turn on certain personal characteristics. And,
it is similarly easy to remind the students who want to construct a system of
contract law that is responsive to too many differences that it may mean that
each party would want the psychological profile of the party he or she is
dealing with before entering into a bargain.
3.

Ian Ayres’ Car Buying Experiments

Most law teachers are familiar with the studies devised and conducted by
Professor Ian Ayres in the early 1990s that deal with differential prices in the
purchase of automobiles.34 Using men and women as well as white and
African-American shoppers and holding constant for as many factors as
possible other than race and gender, he found a ranking in terms of the best
price the four groups of shoppers were able to achieve through negotiation
with car sellers. What Ayres discovered was that African-American shoppers
were consistently made higher initial and final offers by the sales personnel.
Interestingly, each group of buyers did not get their best offers from their race
or gender counterparts. In other words, African-American men did not get
their best offers from African-American men sellers and so on.
Typically, I lay out Ayres’ numbers for my class and describe his
methodology and ask, “What is going one here?” Without exception, a lively
discussion follows as the students try to explain the outcome by reference to
Ayres’ methodology or by reference to sociological factors. Sometimes I draw
their attention to the fact that it appears that both white and African-American
sales people seem to be willing to forego profitable sales before lowering the
price to African-American shoppers to the white level. “Why pass on any
profitable sale?” I ask. Eventually, many of the students come to the
conclusion that this makes no sense unless the sellers know that, as a general
34. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991); Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in
New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109 (1995).
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rule, African-American shoppers will “settle” for a poorer deal than white
shoppers.
This leads to a variety of related considerations. For example, if the sellers
of cars in Ayres’ experiments do have a sense that African-Americans will pay
more, what is this based on? And, if they are right, why are African-Americans
willing to pay more? Finally, most classes include some students who have
worked in a context in which “steering” customers occurs. I allow them to
explain the practice of matching buyers up with particular types of sellers.
One possibility is that the buyer will believe, incorrectly, that the seller is on
his or her side and will not attempt to maximize the return from the exchange.
All of these issues are “on the table” for a discussion of whether contract
law can or should react to price differences and steering. At a more
philosophical level, some students say the issue is not whether AfricanAmericans are “willing” to pay high prices. Instead, they argue that they are
required to pay higher prices. This leads to a broad-based discussion of the
meaning of fairness, good faith and assent and whether contract law should
enforce bargains that seem to be based on social inequalities. As one would
expect, the doctrines of duress and unconscionability are usually brought into
the discussion and the students usually arrive at the conclusion that, while they
are uncomfortable with much of the advantage taking that takes place when
contracts are formed, they are not at all sure that standard contract law has the
tools to address the problem.
4.

Contract Practice and Policy

Perhaps as well-known as Aryes’ work on price discrimination is Russell
Weintraub’s 1992 article in which he describes the results of a survey
examining actual business practices as compared to the more formal rules of
contract.35 In his study, Weintraub queried general counsel of corporations
about how specific contract issues are handled. The questions included ones
about requests for contract modifications as well as more general ones about
the importance of legal sanctions.36 For example, Weintraub asked what the
response would be to a request from a supplier or customer for an adjustment
in price based on a change in market prices. Only 5% of the respondents
reported that they would always insist on adherence to the contract price.37
The relevant factors in a firm’s decision to grant relief included items like the
reasonableness of the request, whether a reasonable profit can be made, and the
length of time the firm had dealt with the requesting firm. The overall results

35. Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1
(1992).
36. Questions were also asked that posed hypotheticals based on actual cases.
37. Weintraub, supra note 35, at 18.
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suggest that formal contract rules do not conform in important ways to the
actual norms that have evolved in the commercial world.
The purpose of introducing the Weintraub materials is two-fold. First, as
every contracts teacher knows, an effort to teach contracts by moving from
case to case and U.C.C. section to U.C.C. section can leave the student with an
understanding of contract law that does not reflect contract “law” as it exists in
practice. Second, as Weintraub discusses, the deviation from formal contract
standards can be explained by a number of factors including non-legal
sanctions. Although Weintraub’s entire article is useful, from the standpoint of
socioeconomics, I stress the non-legal sanctions (some of which are also not
financial) in order to attempt to achieve a broader perspective of what
motivates those making and performing contracts.
*****
As noted at the outset, I cannot claim that a contracts course taught from a
socioeconomic perspective varies much from one taught by anyone with some
insight, even intuitive, into the difference between the view of human
interaction taken in the context of economic theory and that which exists in
reality. A socioeconomic approach is, to me at least, one that examines
contract law through a lens of understanding that behaviors and deal making
are affected by a host of complex factors. From that perspective, one can
assess not simply the fact that a contract is made but the quality of that
contract. Thus, one may conclude that a contract has been formed but also feel
that it is of such poor quality that the law should do little to legitimize it. The
agreement by Bratton, discussed above, might fit this category. Similarly, this
may be the case when a person of one group, defined by class or race, pays
substantially more for a good or service than others.
One objection to this approach is that by examining quality we are tempted
then to do something about poor quality. In other words, an approach that
pierces the contract, one could argue, only makes sense if we are prepared to
respond in some way to “correct” matters. This is, I fully agree, a daunting
and perhaps impossible task for contract law. On the other hand, it is equally
clear that this is nothing more than what judges have been doing. There have
always been exceptions to following the formalistic rules of contracts. In one
sense, all I suggest in my course is that, to the extent this is done, it would
make sense to broaden our understanding of the variables that come into play
when “agreements” are made.

